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1. INTRODUCTION
The negative and persistent effects of violence on micro-development outcomes, including 
behavioral parameters, are well established by a literature on civil conflict and other types of 
political violence. In recent years, however, the global composition of violence has changed with 
a decrease in political violence but an increase in criminal violence. This is particularly true in 
many areas of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) where high levels of violence from gangs 
and drug traffickers have replaced large-scale political violence (World Bank 2011). The effects 
of criminal violence on behavioral parameters are largely unstudied. Consequently, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent the findings of the micro-conflict literature transfer to areas with high 
criminal violence given the differences in the nature and motivation of the underlying violence 
(Kan 2012). 
There are reasons to believe that directly transferring the lessons learnt from the literature on 
conflict to the context of violent crime may be problematic. First, the widespread use of 
geographically aggregate measures of violence in the micro-conflict literature likely overestimates 
both the magnitude and the statistical significance for exposure to criminal violence. The estimated 
coefficients from these aggregate measures depend directly on the relative ratios of directly and 
indirectly affected people within each geographical area (Moya 2015; Rockmore et al. 2016). 
However, compared to conflict exposure, relatively fewer people directly experience violence in 
‘high’ crime areas. Second, even for research which measures individual exposure to violence, 
important differences may exist. The mental health literature emphasizes not only the magnitude 
of the trauma (which is likely more severe during conflicts) but also the distinct number of trauma 
experienced and the duration of the exposure (Goenjian et al. 2005; Hoge et al. 2004; Kaysen et al 
2010; Mollica et al 1998). Compared to individuals in high crime areas, people in conflict settings 
are more likely to be exposed to a broader range of traumatic events for longer durations making 
the effects of direct exposure in conflict areas more severe. 
We use the recent surge of drug-related violence in Mexico to consider whether the lessons derived 
from the micro-conflict literature transfer to areas with criminal violence. In particular, we 
examine the effects of (indirect) exposure1 to criminal violence on two of the key outcomes from 
the micro-conflict literature, risk aversion and social behavior, and one of the primary 
hypothesized channels, mental health.  
The Mexican setting offers several advantages. First, following President Calderon’s election in 
2006 and his subsequent crackdown on drug traffickers, homicide rates surged from the relatively 
stable pre-crackdown levels. Consequently, there is a clear start to the ‘treatment’; i.e., the abrupt 
increase in rates of homicides. Second, the location and levels of violence were not determined by 
individual or local characteristics (Brown 2015; Velásquez 2015). Rather, as arrests and deaths 
weakened drug trafficking organizations, rival organizations and internal factions fought for 
control of territory and drug routes (Guerrero 2012). This exogenous spatial and temporal variation 
in the levels of violence allows for clear identification of treatment effects from changes in local 
homicide rates. Third, the Mexican Family Life Survey, a high quality panel survey, was fielded 
immediately preceding the violence (2005-6) and during the peak levels of violence (2009-12). 
Consequently, while other studies typically assume that there are no systematic differences in the 
distribution of potential outcomes across treatment and comparison groups due to unobserved 
confounders, we are able to employ the weaker assumption of requiring only that the outcomes 
share common pre-treatment trends across the two groups for identification of the treatment effect. 
1 As we subsequently discuss, despite the surge in violence, very few people were directly exposed to violence. 
Consequently, ‘exposure’ refers to the increased insecurity. 
Although we find that ‘exposure’ to high levels of criminal violence negatively impacts the studied 
development outcomes, there are important differences with the previous literature on political 
violence. We first examine the effects on risk aversion. Risk aversion, along with other behavioral 
parameters, has traditionally been considered as being largely fixed (Stigler and Becker 1977). 
However, recent research finds that behavioral parameters can be changed by large shocks 
(Cameron and Shah 2013; Eckel et al. 2009; Malmendier and Nagel 2011) with risk aversion 
responding to both direct (Callen et al. 2015; Moya 2015; Rockmore et al. 2016; Voors et al. 2012) 
and indirect (Jakiela and Ozier 2015; Rockmore et al. 2016) exposure to violence. Similar to prior 
micro-conflict studies, we find that exposure to violence causally affects risk aversion (increases 
the likelihood of being risk averse by 5 percent on average). 
Our results are also broadly consistent with the existing research on the effects of criminal violence 
on risk aversion. In the first such study, Padilla (2012) uses historical individual-level experience 
with violence. Due to our use of a difference-in-difference methodology our results are not directly 
comparable as the individual level experiences are ‘differenced’ away. Potential concerns 
regarding selection into violence based on unobservables, such as in Padilla (2012), have been 
more recently addressed in two contemporaneously developed papers (on Mexico) which also use 
local homicide rates. Manian (2015) focuses on the risk behavior of sex workers (specifically, 
inconsistent condom use) and finds that increased violence reduces sexual risk-taking. Most 
comparable to our work is Brown et al. (2017) who examine the effects of an increase in municipal 
homicide rates on risk aversion. While there are slight differences in the categorization of risk 
aversion, our results are broadly similar.  
We differ, however, from much of the micro-conflict literature with respect to the effect of 
exposure on mental health. In addition to being an important outcome in itself, mental health is 
frequently hypothesized to be a (or even the) channel from exposure to violence to changes in 
behavioral outcomes (Callen et al. 2015; Voors et al. 2012).  However, this hypothesis has only 
been directly examined by Moya (2015) (anxiety disorders) and Rockmore et al. (2016) 
(psychosocial distress) who find that mental health is a channel through which violence affects 
risk aversion.2  
Using a 20 questions mental health module based on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-
Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff 1977) to measure depressive symptoms/anxiety among 
individuals, we examine whether the changes to risk aversion in Mexico are similarly explained 
by a deterioration of mental health. In contrast to these studies, we find no effect of exposure to 
violence on mental health. In part, this is likely due to the high levels of direct exposure in the 
prior studies as compared to our measure of indirect exposure. However, since we find large 
changes in risk aversion, this suggests that while mental health may be a channel through which 
violence affects risk aversion, it is unlikely to be the only channel nor is it potentially necessary 
for these changes to take place. 
Finally, we investigate the effects of exposure on the preferences of individuals for civic 
engagement and social capital at various social distances. These factors, particularly trust (Cassar 
et al. 2013; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Rohner et al. 2013; Voors 
et al. 2012) and political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Bateson 2012; Blattman 2009; 
Morrison and Rockmore, 2016), have been studied by the literature on violence. In their recent 
review of the literature on violence and social cooperation, Bauer et al. (2016) conclude that 
2 Whereas Moya (2015) and Rockmore et al. (2016) examine whether exposure to violence affects risk aversion 
through changes in mental health, an earlier version of Brown et al. (2017) examines the related question of whether 
the level of emotional well-being determines the effects of violence on risk aversion and did not find a statistically 
significant relationship. 
violence leads to greater cooperation and likely increases in-group prosocial behavior. However, 
we do not find any corresponding increase in cooperation. Rather, we find no effect on in-group 
cooperation and increased support for the disregard of laws. 
Taken together, our findings suggest important costs arising from the increased criminal violence 
in Mexico and, potentially, more broadly in LAC. Both risk aversion and social behavior are key 
inputs for economic growth. Risk aversion affects investment decisions and the willingness to 
seize new opportunities (Skriabikova et al. 2014). Similarly, social behavior, such as trust, 
cooperation, and inter-group exchanges, underpin market development and all manners of 
economic interaction (see, for instance, Algan and Cahuc 2010; Fafchamps 2006; Henrich et al. 
2010; Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001) including informal insurance mechanisms. 
Consequently, violence engenders a negative externality on growth via these behavioral changes 
and may partially explain the decreased economic activity attributed to the increased drug violence 
in Mexico (BenYishay and Pearlman 2013; Calderon et al. 2013; Rios 2015).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly describes the evolution of 
homicide rates in Mexico, section 3 describes the data and explains the difference-in-differences 
methodology employed, section 4 discusses our main findings as well as robustness checks and 
results on heterogeneity, and section 5 concludes. 
2. VIOLENCE IN MEXICO
Before the 2006 election of Felipe Calderón to the presidency and his subsequent crackdown on 
organized crime groups (OCGs), violence levels were relatively stable (Figure 1: yearly variation). 
Upon becoming President, Calderón launched a military-led crackdown on OCGs which is 
believed to have led to the subsequent spike in violence (Molzahn et al. 2012; Guerrero 2011). In 
the subsequent four years, the number of homicides roughly tripled, from approximately 8,500 to 
nearly 25,000 between 2007 and 2010. 
Prior to the crackdown, the drug cartels operated in an oligopolistic equilibrium with relatively 
stable levels of violence (Velásquez 2015). The crackdown increased the violence through three 
channels: direct confrontations between the military and OCGs, internal power struggles following 
the arrest/death of major leaders, and attempts by rival organizations to take market share from 
weakened rival organizations (Guerrero 2012). This cycle of violence was self-reinforcing: 
crackdowns led to violence which incited both further government actions and confrontations 
among remaining OCGs. The power struggles also led to a splintering of OGCs as the number 
increased from 6 to 16 within four years (2007-2010). In turn, this further reinforced the cycle of 
violence (Guerrero 2011). 
This violence spilled over onto the civilian population in several ways. First, the increased number 
of OCGs reduced profit margins and pushed them into other criminal activities including 
extortions, kidnapping and thefts to increase profits (Guerrero 2011; Molzahn et al. 2012). Second, 
civilians were targeted to instill fear and hinder cooperation with the government (Brown 2015). 
Lastly, civilians were caught in the cross-fire between heavily armed gangs. The violence was not 
limited to men as women were also directly targeted through kidnappings, murders and rapes, and 
indirectly affected through family exposure (United Nations 2011; Velásquez 2015).  
The violence not only escalated over time but also spread throughout the country. For example, 
only 48 municipalities reported 12 or more homicides in 2007. By 2010, this level of homicides 
occurred in 148 municipalities (Velásquez 2015). Maps 1-3 show the spatial spread of violence 
for 2002, 2005 (the year before President Calderon’s term), and 2009 respectively. By 2009, the 
crackdown had reached full strength as had the reinforcing feedback. This led to violence spikes 
in many previously unaffected municipalities. Moreover, the increase in violence was not uniform 
across municipalities nor time. 
While it is not possible to verify, a large portion of the increased homicides are believed to directly 
result from the crackdown and the violence it engendered.3 This violence was driven by the OCG’s 
and events (such as major arrests) which were beyond the influence of ordinary citizens. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data 
We primarily rely on the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a longitudinal and national 
representative panel with surveys in 2002 (MxFLS1), 2005-06 (MxFLS2), and 2009-12 (MxFLS3) 
respectively.4  We focus on the MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 since data on risk aversion and pro-social 
behavior (discussed further in later sections) are only available for these rounds. However, we also 
include data from MxFLS1 in some analyses since data for mental health (also discussed later) are 
available for all three rounds. These data provide information for the pre-violence (2005-2006) 
and peak violence periods (2009-2012) thereby allowing us to exploit a difference-in-differences 
strategy (which we detail in the next section) in order to identify average treatment effects.  
The 2002 baseline survey collected data from 8,440 households consisting of 35,600 individuals 
in 150 communities of 16 states across Mexico (Rubalcava and Teruel 2013). The individuals in 
baseline households were followed in subsequent waves. The attrition rates were very low with 
89% and 87% of respondents re-interviewed in the second (2005-06) and third waves (2009-12) 
3 A variety of estimates exist for the share of drug violence in total homicides, ranging from 30 to 90 percent. However, 
it is often not possible to accurately distinguish the cause of violent deaths making any estimates inherently unreliable. 
Irrespective of the source of homicide data, however, there is a notable increase in homicides after the 2006 election 
of Calderon. 
4 94% of the data for the third wave was collected in the years 2009 and 2010 (Brown 2015). 
respectively. We restrict the sample to adults (15 and older) since children did not answer the risk 
preference, mental health, or social behavior modules. After cleaning the data and dropping 
observations with missing information, our final sample size consists of 8,650 individuals.5    
We supplement the MxFLS data with data on the monthly municipal level homicide rate from the 
Mexican National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI in spanish) which records all 
intentional homicides. These data, however, report information only on registered homicides. This 
could be an important concern if the drug cartel-related homicides are significantly underreported. 
Velásquez (2015) addressed this concern by comparing the INEGI data with the data on homicides 
related to organized crime (which is reported by the President’s Office) and finds similar trends. 
We use the former data instead of the latter since they are available for a longer span of time (1990-
2012) thus allowing us to examine both the pre-escalation and escalation periods. 
3.1.1 Violence and Treatment Assignment 
Although homicide rates more than tripled over this period, only a small fraction of people were 
ever directly exposed to homicides. For instance, in our sample, not a single household member 
died due to a violent incident outside of their household.6 This is not surprising as the median 
homicide rate was only 10.6 per 100,000 inhabitants. Consequently, the significant increase in the 
homicide rate increased the potential of being a victim and, most likely, the perceived insecurity. 
We therefore interpret our treatment as the indirect effect of violence.7 Moreover, our use of a 
5 This varies based on outcome variables. 
6 Unfortunately, there is no question about violence within the household. More broadly, less than 5% of the sample 
reporting ‘ever [having] been assaulted, robbed, or have you been a victim of any violent incident, outside your 
household, plot, or business since 2005 to date.’ The vast majority (93%) of these reported having been robbed or 
assaulted. 
7 Note that indirect exposure to violence may represent the bulk of the ‘costs’ of violence (Rockmore, 2016). 
geographical measure of exposure to violence also matches the literature as few studies use data 
on individual level exposure. 
As noted earlier, the increase in violence was not homogenous; it occurred in different areas at 
different points in time. Consequently, our ‘treatment’ relates to the lowest geographical level for 
which the homicide rate is available: the municipality.8 Specifically, we use the number of 
homicides per 10,000 inhabitants in a municipality in twelve months prior to the interview date as 
our continuous measure of treatment.   
3.1.2 Risk Preferences 
Risk preferences are constructed using the risk modules from the second and third waves of the 
MxFLS data. These are designed as a simple gamble-choice task (Eckel and Grossman 2008). The 
survey played hypothetical games by asking respondents to choose sequentially between two 
different lotteries.9 The risk module from the second wave is shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
In a series of games, the respondents are offered two choices: a safe option of a bag with two chips 
of equal values of 1,000 pesos while the other bag varies both in terms of risk and expected payoffs. 
This in line with the seminal work of Binswanger (1980), as well as the micro-conflict literature 
on risk aversion, which suggests that higher expected payoff can be earned only at the cost of 
higher variance. At each stage, respondents are offered a choice between the two choices. The 
most risk averse person chooses the safe option throughout and ends up at the terminal point in the 
lower left corner (category 1). The least risk averse person ends up at the terminal point in the 
8 Since selection into violence is unlikely to be random, we do not focus on individual level exposure.  
9 A possible concern is that the absence of real financial rewards affects responses (Holt and Laury 2002). Hamoudi 
and Thomas (2006) examine this by comparing survey answers with experimentally derived measures of preferences 
using a subset of the MxFLS households. They find that preferences measured using the survey and the experiment 
are highly correlated. 
lower right corner (category 5). Consequently, the terminal points characterize an ordinal ranking 
of risk preferences among the respondents.  
Similar categories are created using the risk module from the third wave. Although the payoffs in 
the third wave differed, they are measured in the same way. Consequently, there is a common shift 
for everyone in the third wave. With our difference-in-difference methodology, this common shift 
is ‘differenced’ away so that, as in the second wave, we recover the relevant average treatment 
effect. Finally, the ordered variable is transformed into a binary variable by combining the two 
most risk averse groups (=1, 0 otherwise). Hence, a positive average treatment effect implies an 
increase in risk aversion due to exposure to violence. Since the threshold for conversion is 
arbitrary, we subsequently examine an alternate specification.  
3.1.3 Mental Health 
We construct a measure of mental health based on the twenty-question module where the 
respondent reports his/her own perception about emotional status in the past four weeks. This 
module is based on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression scale (CES-D). The CES-D 
was first developed by Radloff (1977) and was designed for inclusion in surveys. It has been 
described as ‘the workhorse of depression [psychiatric] epidemiology’ and validated by the 
American Psychological Association. 10 11  The MxFLS module was also authenticated by the 
Mexican Institute of Psychiatry (Calderon 1997) to identify anxiety and moderate and severe 
depression.  
Each question is given a score from 1 to 4 (with 1 being normal and 4 being severe). These are 
added to construct the depression index ranging between 20 and 80. In clinical settings, the CES-
10 http://cesd-r.com/about-cesdr/ 
11 Steffick (2000) extensively discusses the CES-D. 
D is associated with a particular cutoff value (the precise value depends on how the particular 
CES-D or variant is measured) where values above that cutoff indicate elevated risk for clinical 
depression. In the MxFLS context, according to the guidelines of the National Institute of 
Psychiatrics, the CES-D score has been partitioned as follows: 1=normal (20-35); 2=anxious (36-
45); 3=moderately depressed (46-65); and 4=severely depressed (66-80). In our benchmark 
exercises, we consider a binary dependent variable (depression indicator) by combining the 
moderately and severely depressed categories into one category and assign the category a value of 
1; 0 otherwise. A positive average treatment effect on this outcome therefore implies a 
deterioration in mental health due to exposure to violence. For robustness, we also consider an 
alternate threshold and directly using the underlying CES-D scores as the outcome variable of 
interest. 
3.1.4 Social Behavior 
While the broader literature on trust and cooperation typically uses variations of Almond and 
Verba’s (1963) ‘trust question’ (Capra et al. 2008), this is often not true of the micro-conflict 
literature. With the exception of several studies using large multi-country surveys (e.g. 
Afrobarometer, the Life in Transition Survey), the micro-conflict literature often relies on proxies, 
reported behavior, and/or experimental evidence.12 
Similar to much of this literature, we rely on proxies for trust since the MxFLS does not contain 
the ‘trust question’. We focus on two questions answered by respondent using a 4 point Likert 
scale. Specifically, respondents are asked whether (i) ‘Laws are made to be broken’, and (ii) ‘No 
12	Bauer et al. (2016) identify 7 studies which use survey measures of trust: only 4 used variations of the ‘trust 
question.’ Cilliers et al. (2016), which is not included in the Bauer et al., uses a mix for ‘trust’ and non-trust questions 
for their index of generalized trust in the community. Similarly, Silva and Mace (2014) rely on survey behavior of real 
life actions as their measure of cooperation. 
one should get involved in family or friends’ problems’. In our baseline exercises, we convert these 
survey responses into binary dependent variables where the ‘completely agree’ and ‘agree’ 
responses are grouped together and assigned the value of 1; 0 otherwise.13   
These statements can be interpreted as eliciting individual behavioral preferences that map into 
various forms of social capital (see, Dasgupta 2005; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004); in particular, 
the deeply related concepts of social norms and trust.  Statement (i) reflects the individual’s view 
of her relationship with the broader civic (legal) institutions.14 To the extent that exposure to 
violence results in the breakdown of conformity to social norms embedded in formal legal 
institutions, we would expect to see a reduction in the stock of generalized trust in society (Knack 
and Keefer 1997).  
Statement (ii) addresses a special type of social network: kinship networks. We will refer to 
statement (ii) as ‘private social capital’ in Section 4.3 below. Since it represents cooperation within 
a homogenous group only, Statement (ii) is arguably a proxy for ‘bonding social capital’ since this 
sort of capital refers to relationships between members of a network who share some similarity 
(such as family or friendship) (Putnam, 2000).15 Collectively, therefore, the two statements allow 
us to investigate how increased insecurity changes individual pro-social behavioral preferences at 
different social distances. 
3.2 Methodology 
13 There is also an option of responding ‘don’t know’. We drop individuals who responded with ‘don’t know’ to 
preserve the interpretability of the binary variable (<1% of the sample).  
14 This ‘classification’ of the question follows Knack and Keefer (1997) who similar interpret several questions on 
breaking the law.	
15 This classification is also similar to Bauer et al (2006) who ‘define in-group members as people from the same 
family, village, class, and ethnic group’ (p. 260). 
Typical of the literature, we use a linear differences-in-difference (DiD) model (Bertrand et al 
2004) that has been generalized to a continuous treatment: 
!"#$%&'(,*,+ = -.%&/$/0'	23#'*,+ + 56(,*,+ + 78*,+ + 9+ + :* + ;(,*,+ 
Where !"#$%&'(,*,+ is the relevant outcome for individual i living in municipality j in survey t. 
As noted earlier, we examine three broad outcomes: risk aversion, mental health and social 
behavior (private social capital and civic norms of cooperation). .%&/$/0'	<3#'*,+ is the measure 
of violence defined at the municipality level. We primarily measure it using the (continuous) 
municipal homicide rate (per 10,000 inhabitants). As we subsequently discuss, in our robustness 
checks we also use binary measures for above/below the median and third quartile municipal 
homicide rate. The dummy variable, ++, denotes the treatment wave of the MxFLS. Consequently, 
- represents the average treatment effect on the treated.
6(,*,+ controls for individual and household level characteristics. These include the gender, age and 
age squared, education level, and marriage and employment status of individual i. In certain 
specifications, we further control for municipal characteristics represented by 8*,+: border with the 
US, agriculture production area, housing (total private dwellings), average household size, 
conviction and literacy rates, and health care access. Finally, :* and 9+ are municipal and time 
fixed effects, respectively. 
As noted earlier, the levels of violence in Mexico were lower than those in many conflicts. 
Consequently, one potential concern is that the effects of violence only occur after a particular 
‘violence threshold’. Consequently, we examine the robustness of our results by replacing our 
continuous measure of homicides with binary treatment variables using two thresholds: the median 
municipal homicide level in 2009 (10.6 per 100,000 inhabitants) and the third quartile in 2009 
(18.9 per 100,000).  
Finally, we note that identification assumes an exogenous surge in violence. It is possible that the 
surge in violence was related to unobserved changes in characteristics at the level of the 
municipality. Brown (2015) formally examines this issue using data on pre-escalation trends for 
135 baseline municipalities of MxFLS to predict each municipality’s homicide rate in 2009 along 
with the change in the homicide rate between 2005 and 2009. He does not find any evidence that 
the pre-escalation trends in the observed characteristics of municipalities were related to future 
homicide rates.16 This evidence provides some assurance that the surge in violence may be 
exogenous to municipalities’ characteristics.17  
4. RESULTS
4.1 Violence and Risk Preference 
The literature on the effects of exposure to violence on risk attitudes consistently finds significant 
effects, sometimes more than 50 years after the initial exposure (Kim and Lee, 2014). The exact 
effects, however, are less clear due to the considerable variation in the estimated effects. Moreover, 
while most studies find increased risk aversion, a prominent early study finds the opposite (Voors 
et al. 2012). Rockmore et al. (2016) demonstrate that the wide range of estimated effects (and even 
the differing signs of the estimated effect) may arise from the varying individual exposure – both 
types of direct exposure to violence and different responses to direct and indirect exposure. With 
the exception of Jakiela and Ozier (2015)18, previous estimates reflect some population weighted 
16 For details on how these trends were created, see Brown (2015).  
17 Velásquez (2015) followed the same strategy and found similar results. 
18 Jakiela and Ozier (2015) study the effect of exposure to the post-election violence in Kenya. Since the vast majority 
of their sample only apparently suffered indirect exposure to violence, they largely measure the effect of an increase 
in insecurity. 
average of these different forms of exposure. One strength of this paper is that we are able to isolate 
the effects of a large increase in indirect exposure to violence (i.e. the increased insecurity) since 
our sample is not directly affected by the violence.19  
Table 1 divides the sample into communities with above and below median homicide rates in 2009 
(10.6 per 100,000 inhabitants) and compares the pre-treatment means for the control variables. 
With the exception of age, age squared, and household size, the characteristics for the two groups 
are very similar. The differences due to bordering the US are understandable since this area often 
forms part of the drug corridor to the US. Consequently, these are very profitable areas and 
vigorously contested. 
We formally estimate the linear DiD using the continuous treatment variable in Table 2 (Panel A). 
In this and subsequent tables, we begin by just controlling for household characteristics (odd 
columns) before adding municipal control variables (even columns). The estimated coefficients 
represent the increase in risk aversion from an additional homicide (per 10,000 inhabitants) in the 
municipality. Our estimated coefficients are largely consistent with bulk of the micro-conflict 
literature that finds that exposure to violence increases risk aversion. Specifically, an increase of 
1 homicide increases the likelihood of being risk averse by 1.8 to 2.0 percentage points (columns 
1 and 2). This represents approximately 5 percent increase in risk aversion from the average. We 
find similar results, albeit with larger coefficients, in the robustness tests (columns 3-6). This is 
understandable since it represents exposure to a bigger ‘shock’. The estimated magnitude, a 9-11 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of being in the risk averse group, is qualitatively similar 
to Moya (2015).  
19 The literature on the effects of violence on social cooperation similarly combines these effects. 
Since the threshold for the binary outcome variable is arbitrary, we examine an alternate threshold 
in Panel B of Table 2 by using the second category as the new threshold for the binary variable. 
To verify the robustness of the baseline findings to alternative thresholds (at least qualitatively), 
we recode the binary variable such that the first three categories are now assigned the value of 1 
in the binary conversion. The estimate coefficients are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A 
with slight increase in magnitudes. This suggests that our earlier results are not due to the particular 
transformation of the categorical outcome variable into a binary variable.  
Similarly, we examine whether there is any heterogeneity based on individual characteristics. In 
results presented in the supplementary appendix, we find no statistically significant differences 
based on gender, age, or education levels.  
We therefore conclude that exposure to violence at the municipality level in Mexico results in 
people becoming more risk averse and that this result is robust to different specifications, and 
change of the thresholds for the binary conversion of the risk aversion outcome variable. 
Moreover, there is limited heterogeneity in the effect of violence exposure on risk aversion across 
gender, age or education levels (Online Appendix: Table A1). These results are broadly consistent 
with the broader micro-conflict literature.  
4.2 Violence and Mental Health 
The literature on the effects of exposure to violence in risk aversion invariably notes the effects of 
the exposure on mental health. While the effects described in the mental health literature appear 
consistent with changes in behavioral parameters (Macksoud et al. 1993), this has only been 
studied twice (Moya 2015; Rockmore et al. 2016). While these studies find that mental health is 
an important channel, it only explains part of the subsequent changes in risk aversion (Rockmore 
et al. 2016). We build on these two studies by exploring the effects of violence exposure on mental 
health with two questions in mind: First, does violence affect mental health in the Mexican 
context? Second, if there is an effect, is this an (important) channel for explaining the increased 
risk aversion? 
We investigate these questions in Table 3 (Panel A) and find that the estimated coefficients are 
statistically insignificant and close to zero. This lack of significance for the effect of violence 
exposure on mental health is initially surprising since this pathway implicitly (and explicitly) 
underlies much of the existing literature. One possibility is that this is caused by our combining 
moderate and severe depression into one category (to create a binary variable). We therefore re-
estimated the models recoding severe depression as 1 and everything else as 0. As shown in Panel 
B, the results are qualitatively similar to our earlier results. Another possibility is that mental health 
only responds to higher levels of violence but we find no support for this (column 3-6). Lastly, we 
replicate the analysis using the underlying mental health score in place of the binary depression 
variable and find no statistically significant effect (Appendix Table A2).20 
The difference between our results and Moya (2015) or Rockmore et al. (2016) is likely due to the 
exposure to violence in the respective samples. The mental health literature suggests that direct 
(and prolonged) exposure to violence is required for substantial changes to mental health. These 
earlier studies focused on setting where there a large proportion of the sample was directly affected 
by (high levels of) violence. In contrast, as shown by our data, relatively few people are directly 
exposed to violence in Mexico. Since we use an aggregate measure of violence, this suggests that 
‘too few’ people are exposed to violence and/or the average level of exposure is not sufficiently 
high to change mental health levels. That said, our results do suggest that while mental health may 
20 We find no heterogeneity across gender, education and age in terms of sign, significance and magnitude. Similar 
effects are found using the alternate robustness tests.  
play an important role for changes in risk aversion, it is not a necessary condition. We find clear 
and robust changes to risk aversion without any corresponding changes to mental health.21 This 
suggests that the focus on mental health in the literature, while important, may ignore other 
relevant channels. 
4.3 Violence and Pro-Social Behavior 
In their recent review of the micro-conflict literature on social cooperation, Bauer et al. (2016) find 
a remarkably consistent effect irrespective of gender, age, or even victim vs perpetrator of 
violence. In particular, exposure to violence leads to ‘pro-social’ behavior as individuals join local 
groups, become more politically active and serve as local leaders. The limited available evidence 
suggests that this pro-social behavior is targeted towards in-groups (e.g. kinship networks, local 
areas) and may come at the expense of out-group cooperation. Since Bauer et al. (2016) only 
include 2 studies with criminal violence, they only tentatively suggest that exposure to violence 
may be more important than the particular type of violence (i.e. exposure to violence versus 
exposure to ‘war’).  That is, the effects of exposure to violence on social cooperation are also 
consistent across types of violence.22 This subsection examines this hypothesis across different 
types of social co-operation. 
We first examine the impact of violence on private social capital (statement (ii)) in Panel A of 
Table 4. We note that the negative sign for the ATET means that the respondents disagree with the 
21 As noted earlier, an earlier version of Brown et al. (2017) investigates the related question of whether emotional 
well-being mediates the effects of exposure to violence on risk aversion and does not find any statistically significant 
effects. Their measure is based on the Short Form 36 Health Survey, a general measure of physical and mental health. 
Their findings are consistent with ours. We differ in that our measure of mental health (based on CES-D scale) has 
been validated to indicate clinical depression symptoms and provides a more direct and specific measure of that 
particular dimension of mental health. Irrespective, we view the results in both papers as fundamentally 
complementary.  
22 In fact, they directly reference the Mexican context as somewhere where there may be minimal difference between 
crime and civil conflict. 
statement ‘No one should get involved in family or friends’ problems’. The estimation results, 
however, are statistically insignificant. Since this differs from Bauer et al.’s (2016) review of the 
literature, we consider several possible explanations23. First, similar to our discussion of mental 
health, we consider whether these effects manifest themselves at higher levels of homicide rates 
using a binary treatment indicators with thresholds (column 3-6) but again find no effect. We then 
consider whether the effect varies by age as Bauer et al. (2013) find that exposure to violence 
affects in-group (egalitarian) behavior but only when individuals are exposed between ages 7 and 
20 years old. Unfortunately, the youngest people in our sample are 15 so we cannot examine the 
full range. However, the estimated coefficient for the 15-20 year old sample (in 2009) is not 
significant (although it is larger in magnitude).24 
Taken together, these results suggest that exposure to increased insecurity does not affect in-group 
social capital. This stands in sharp contrast to the micro-conflict literature where the increased 
private social capital potentially offsets decreased civil social capital. For example, Cassar et al. 
(2013) found, in the context of the Tajik civil war, that exposure to conflict resulted in a reduction 
in the willingness to engage in impersonal interactions while reinforcing kinship-based morality 
norms. Similarly, Rohner et al. (2013) that the fighting decreased generalized trust while 
increasing ethnic identity In Uganda. In part, this may reflect the strong in- and out-group aspects 
to civil conflict (e.g. ethnic identity) which are not present in the criminal violence in Mexico.  
We next examine our findings for statement (i) of pro-social behavior; i.e., broader civic norms. 
The estimated coefficients are statistically significant in every specification (Table 4: Panel B).25  
A possible explanation could be that people who experience an increase in violence perceive their 
23 These results are available upon request. 
24 These results are available upon request.	
25	We find some support for differences across gender.	
exposure as a failure of the system/institutions by the public to protect them. This loss of trust in 
civic institutions and, in particular, in the rule of law leads to a reduction in the desire to comply 
with these laws leading to lower levels of social capital (Paras 2007). Our results are generally 
supportive of the findings of Blanco (2012) and Blanco and Ruiz (2013) for Mexico and Columbia, 
respectively, who employ different data26 and find that increased perceptions of insecurity and 
crime victimization have negative effects on trust in institutions related to the criminal justice 
system.  
4.4. Migration and Attrition 
We finally address two other potential threats to identification27; i.e., migration and sample 
attrition. In order to address these concerns, we follow the approaches in Brown (2015) and 
Velásquez (2015). 
4.4.1 Migration 
Migration (e.g., out of high violence municipalities) potentially poses a threat to identification if 
it is driven by unobserved factors. It turns out that those respondents who migrated between the 
pre- and post-treatment waves represent only 3% percent of the sample. Nevertheless, we attempt 
to directly verify that this migration was not in response to violence. We first constructed a measure 
of migration by using a dummy variable to indicate whether the respondent’s municipality changed 
between the second and third waves of the data. Using a probit model, this indicator is then 
regressed on the change in homicide rates between 2005 and 2009 controlling for a set of individual 
26 Specifically, survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Encuesta Nacional Sobre 
la Inseguridad (ENSI). 
27 In results which are available upon request, we conduct standard falsification (i.e., placebo) tests for the binary 
treatment variables using pre-treatment data. We directly examine this for mental health. Due to a lack of data, we 
cannot directly examine this for risk aversion or social behavior and therefore examine on other pre-treatment variables 
that are correlated with risk aversion and pro-social behavior. 
and household characteristics and state fixed effects. The results (marginal effects) are shown in 
Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 confirm that migration is not associated with the surge in 
violence. The coefficients of the change in violence are not significantly different from zero 
indicating that the surge in violence does not predict migration.  
This result is consistent with Brown (2015) for this particular measure of migration. Moreover, 
migration behavior does not appear to be specific to any group; the coefficients to the interaction 
terms between change in violence and individual and household characteristics are insignificant 
except for the case of married people. However, even in this latter case, the coefficient is 
significant at only the 10% level and the small value of the coefficient suggests a small impact on 
migration decision.  In unreported results (available upon request), we also check that our baseline 
results are robust to dropping migrants from the sample and find that this is, in fact, the case. 
4.4.2 Attrition 
The attrition rate between the pre- and post-treatment samples (i.e., MxFLS2 and MxFLS3) is 
23%. This is certainly a substantial number.  We attempt to check whether the decision to attrite 
from the sample was affected by the surge in violence. We define an attrition variable that takes 
the value 1 if the respondent was not present in the MxFLS3 wave conditional on being present in 
the MxFLS2 wave; 0 otherwise (Velásquez 2015). We then run a probit regression of the attrition 
variable on the change in homicide rates between 2005 and 2009, a set of individual and household 
characteristics and state fixed effects. The results (marginal effects) from the probit regression are 
shown in columns 3 and 4 in Table 5. The evidence suggests that attrition from the MxFLS3 is 
potentially not being caused by anticipation of future violence. Similar results are found in Brown 
(2015) and Velásquez (2015). Moreover, except for years of education, the interaction terms for 
change in violence and individual and household characteristics are also insignificant, suggesting 
that violence does not predict attrition within specific groups. The coefficient of the interaction 
term for education, although statistically significant, is also small suggesting a negligible effect on 
the decision to attrite from the panel.  
Overall, our findings for migration and attrition suggests that the surge in violence was plausibly 
exogenous, and, at least across the span of the pre- and post-treatment waves of the data, 
individuals did not spatially sort across treatment and control municipalities nor systematically 
attrite from the panel because of it.  
5. CONCLUSION
With the rise of criminal violence in many areas of the world, it is important to understand its 
consequences for economic behavior. Using the exogenous surge in violence caused by the 
crackdown on the drug trade in Mexico, we present one of the first systematic examinations of its 
effects in the context of Mexico and consider how these results differ from the earlier micro-
conflict literature.  
Similar to much of the literature, we find strong evidence of increased risk aversion. Insofar as we 
have a ‘clean’ measure of insecurity, our results suggest that the effects of violence need not be 
limited to directly affected population as indirectly exposed individuals are also affected (similar 
to Rockmore (2016) study of the relative per capita consumption costs of direct vs indirect 
exposure). We differ, however, with respect to the effects of violence exposure on mental health. 
Prior research focuses on mental health as the primary channel through which changes in risk 
aversion occur. Although we find strong effects of exposure to violence on risk aversion, we do 
not find a similar effect on mental health. At the very least, this result suggests that while mental 
health changes may be one channel for determining risk aversion, it is unlikely to be the only 
channel. Further research is required to identify alternate channels. 
Finally, we also investigate the effects of violence exposure on pro-social behavior. We find that 
exposure to violence resulted in a reduced willingness to support generalized social institutions 
(e.g., legal and generalized social norms). This potentially arises from the direct loss of trust due 
to the perceived failure of state institutions to stem violence and to protect the public from its 
consequences. In part, this may explain why insecurity arising from crime is linked to decreased 
support for democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean (Cruz, 2008). In contrast to the micro-
conflict literature, we do not observe any concurrent strengthening of personal/kinship bonds to 
offset the aforementioned decrease in support. Consequently, in contrast to the micro-conflict 
literature, our results suggest that increased criminal violence generally lowers civic cooperation 
and trust. 
The duration of these effects, however, is unclear. Although both the mental health (Hubbard et 
al. 1995; Kulka et al. 1990; McSharry and Kinny 1992; Schnurr et al. 2004) and micro-conflict 
(Kim and Lee 2014) literatures find that behavioral changes arising from trauma can persist for 
decades, these typically study direct exposure to high levels of trauma. Whether or not these effects 
similarly persist after exposure to insecurity is unclear. In large part, this will determine whether 
this friction on growth persists after the decline of the current levels of violence
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Source: Authors’ calculations using INEGI data 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 




































































































Observations 4274 4376 
Note: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are reported in parenthesis.  Household wealth is measured 
by whether or not the respondent owns a house. All the characteristics are from pre-escalation period 
(2005-06 survey). 
Table 2: Risk Aversion 
Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 




























Household Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 17294 17294 17294 17294 17294 17294 
Note: *** and ** show significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at 
municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual level control variables include age, age square, gender, 
education, marital status, employment status, household size, household expenditure and wealth. The municipality 
characteristics include municipality level literacy rate, access to health services, total number of private dwellings, 
number of persons per dwelling, conviction rate and an indicator for whether the municipality is along the US border 
or touches the route to the US.  
Table 3: Mental Health 
Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 




























Household Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 17294 17294 17294 17294 17294 17294 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual level control 
variables include age, age square, gender, education, marital status, employment status, household size, household 
expenditure and wealth. The municipality characteristics include municipality level literacy rate, access to health 
services, total number of private dwellings, number of persons per dwelling, conviction rate and an indicator for 
whether the municipality is along the US border or touches the route to the US.  
Table 4: Pro-Social Behavior 
Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 




























Household Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 16021 16021 16021 16021 16021 16021 
Note: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at 
municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual level control variables include age, age square, gender, 
education, marital status, employment status, household size, household expenditure and wealth. The municipality 
characteristics include municipality level literacy rate, access to health services, total number of private dwellings, 
number of persons per dwelling, conviction rate and an indicator for whether the municipality is along the US border 
or touches the route to the US.  
Table 5: Migration and Attrition between MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 
Migration Attrition 
(1) (2) (3) (4)













































Observations  10,410 9,997 19,769 19,769
Mean of Dependent Variable 3.10% 3.23% 22.99% 22.99%
State FE No Yes No Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. ** and * show significance at 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The homicide rates are per 100,000. Probit model is used for regressions. The coefficients reported in 
the table are marginal effects. 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
Figure A1: Choice over Hypothetical Games (MxFLS2) 
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Table A1: Heterogeneous Effects for Risk Aversion 
Variable Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Panel A: Gender 




















Observations 17294 6696 10598 17294 6696 10598 17294 6696 10598 
Panel B: Education 




















Observations 17294 10136 7158 17294 10136 7158 17294 10136 7158 
Panel C: Age 




















Observations 17294 9424 7870 17294 9424 7870 17294 9424 7870 
Household Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. 
The individual and municipality level controls are the same used in main regressions.  
Table A2: Mental Health Results using Continuous Variable 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 












Observations 17294 17294 
Household Ch. Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. No Yes 
Panel C: Heterogeneous Effects 
I. Gender














Observations 17294 6696 10598 17294 6696 10598 
II. Education














Observations 17294 10136 7158 17294 10136 7158 
III. Age














Observations 17294 9424 7870 17294 9424 7870 
Household Ch. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Ch. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual and 
municipality level controls are the same used in main regressions. Panel A shows the results when the treatment was 
defined as exposure to above median violence. Panel B checks the robustness by changing the treatment assignment 
to municipalities who have experienced above 75th percentile violence. Panel C provides the heterogeneity analysis 
across gender, education and age. 
Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects for Pro-Social Behavior – Broader Civic Norms 
Variable Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Panel A: Gender 



































16021 6306 9715 16021 6306 9715 16021 6306 9715 
Panel B: Education 
Total < 9 
Yrs. 




































16021 9197 6824 16021 9197 6824 16021 9197 6824 
Panel C: Age 










































16021 8859 7162 16021 8859 7162 16021 8859 7162 
Household 
Ch. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipalit
y Ch. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at 
municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual and municipality level controls are the same used in main 
regressions. 
Table A4: Heterogeneous Effects for Pro-Social Behavior – Private Social Capital 
Variable Continuous Treatment Binary (Median) Binary (3rd Quartile) 
Panel A: Gender 




















Observations 16020 6306 9714 16021 6306 9715 16020 6306 9714 
Panel B: Education 
Total < 9 
Yrs. 
≥9 Yrs. Total < 9 
Yrs. 




















Observations 16020 9196 6824 16021 9197 6824 16020 9196 6824 
Panel C: Age 































Observations 16020 8858 7162 16021 8859 7162 16020 8858 7162 
Household 
Ch. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
Ch. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at 
municipality level, are shown in parenthesis. The individual and municipality level controls are the same used in main 
regressions.  
